The Geopolitical Reconfiguration of Western Eurasia: The Sino-Iranian Strategic Nexus Amidst Global Conflict (2024-2026)

Start hereChina bought more than 80% of Iran's shipped oil in 2025. Yet by October 2026, Iran had loaded no crude for export since late August, according to Kpler. What is left of the partnership in wartime?

First written March 2026. Brought up to date on 13 October 2026. This page describes a war that is still going on. Everything below is dated to the source it comes from; anything that depends on the state of the fighting may have moved since. It describes; it does not predict.

01The Sino-Iranian Strategic Nexus Amidst Global Conflict (2024-2026)

Between April 2024 and February 2026, the long-running shadow conflict between Iran and Israel turned into open war. The United States struck Iranian nuclear sites in June 2025, and from 28 February 2026 it went to war with Iran directly. Through all of it, China remained the main buyer of Iran’s oil and defended Iran diplomatically.

This page sets out what the sources show about that relationship:

• the oil trade;

• the 25-year partnership;

• reported arms deals;

• China’s diplomacy;

• the money.

It ends with where the war stood on 13 October 2026.

02The Escalation Continuum: From Shadow War to Decapitation (2024-2026)

• April 2024. Iran launched hundreds of drones and missiles from its own territory towards Israel, most of which were intercepted, according to the UN. Iran said it was responding to an attack on its diplomatic premises in Damascus on 1 April.

• July 2024. Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh was killed in Tehran.

• Late September 2024. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah was killed in Israeli airstrikes on the southern suburbs of Beirut.

• June 2025. The IAEA said Iran was in breach of its non-proliferation obligations. From 13 June 2025 Israel struck Iran’s nuclear programme, missile sites and energy facilities, and Iran fired missiles and drones back. On 22 June the United States struck three Iranian nuclear sites, including Fordow. A ceasefire announced by President Trump took effect on 24 June 2025. The Commons Library describes the episode as joint strikes “over 12 days”.

• August-September 2025. On 28 August 2025 the UK, France and Germany triggered the snapback mechanism of the 2015 nuclear deal. Six earlier UN sanctions resolutions on Iran were reinstated from 27 September 2025.

• February 2026. On 27 February, Oman’s foreign minister, who had mediated talks between the US and Iran, said that “a peace deal is within our reach”. The next day, 28 February 2026, Israel and the United States launched strikes on Iran; the US operation was named Operation Epic Fury. Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, was killed in the strikes. Iran responded by attacking US bases in the region, Israel and sites in neighbouring states, and by closing the Strait of Hormuz.

03Domestic Fragility and the Economic Crisis of 2026

Protests began on 28 December 2025, after a sharp collapse of Iran’s currency, starting with shopkeepers in Tehran’s Grand Bazaar. According to the UN fact-finding mission on Iran, they reached all of Iran’s 31 provinces.

Amnesty International describes the killing of thousands of protesters by security forces on 8 and 9 January 2026, thousands more arrests, and a shutdown of internet access from 8 January.

Executions rose sharply before that. Amnesty International recorded at least 2,159 executions in Iran in 2025, more than double its 2024 figure. Iran drove a global total that Amnesty calls the highest it has recorded since 1981.

On 8 March 2026 Iran’s Assembly of Experts announced that Mojtaba Khamenei, Ali Khamenei’s son, would succeed his father as supreme leader. The UK government said the choice “suggests no change in direction from Iran”. In the UK House of Commons Library’s account (April 2026), he had not appeared in public since taking office.

04The Sino-Iranian Energy Nexus: A Strategic Lifeblood

China is the main buyer of Iranian oil. Estimates of how dependent Iran is on that one customer differ with the source:

Measure	Figure	Source
China’s imports of Iranian crude, 2025	1.38 million barrels per day	Kpler, cited by Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy
Share of Iran’s shipped oil bought by China, 2025	more than 80%	Kpler, cited by Al Jazeera
Share of Iran’s oil exports going to China	more than 90%	US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, cited by the House of Commons Library
Iranian crude as part of China’s seaborne imports, 2025	about 1.4 of 10.4 million barrels per day	Kpler, cited by Al Jazeera

That last line works out at about 13% of China’s seaborne crude imports: a large supplier, but a minority of the total. The Commons Library adds that oil exports provide around a third of Iran’s annual state revenue.

The oil arrives under other names. China’s customs agency has not recorded any oil imports from Iran since 2022. Many Iranian barrels are relabelled as Malaysian. China imported 1.3 million barrels a day of “Malaysian” crude in 2025, while Malaysia produced 535,000 barrels a day in 2024, according to the Columbia analysis.

Al Jazeera describes the small independent refineries known as “teapots”, mostly in Shandong province, as the channel for discounted Iranian and Russian oil.

China had a cushion. As of early January 2026 it held 1.206 billion barrels of oil in onshore storage. That was enough for 104 days of net crude imports at the 2025 level, by the Columbia estimate.

The war changed the flow. In June 2026, under the US-Iran memorandum, the US Treasury issued a waiver for Iranian oil exports running until 21 August 2026.

In August 2026, Reuters reported that offers of Iranian crude to Chinese buyers had fallen as the US blockade took hold. By October, Iran had not loaded any crude oil for export since late August because of the US naval blockade, according to Kpler data reported by CNBC.

1.38m bpd	China’s imports of Iranian crude (Kpler, via Columbia CGEP)
>80%	Share of Iran’s shipped oil bought by China (Kpler)
>90%	Share of Iran’s oil exports going to China (US commission)
104 days	China’s onshore storage, in net imports, early January 2026

Estimates differ with the source; each is named in the section.

05Beyond Oil: The 25-Year Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP)

Iran and China signed a 25-year strategic accord on 27 March 2021. It is often described as a plan for US$400 billion of Chinese investment in Iran’s energy, banking, telecommunications and transport, in return for a regular supply of oil.

That figure is reported, not confirmed. In April 2021, analysts at Brandeis University’s Crown Center noted that the terms and details of the agreement remained unknown. Some commentators, they noted, were relying on an earlier leaked draft. We found no published text of the signed agreement.

06Military and Security Cooperation: The Defense Dimension

Four reports stand out. None is a confirmed transaction.

• Missile fuel chemicals, early 2025. In February 2025, CNN reported, citing two European intelligence sources, that a ship had left China with most of a 1,000-ton shipment of sodium perchlorate. That chemical is the main precursor of the solid propellant for Iran’s mid-range missiles. The sources estimated it was enough for about 260 motors for Kheibar Shekan missiles.

• Anti-ship missiles, 2026. In February 2026, Reuters reported that Iran was close to a deal to buy Chinese CM-302 supersonic anti-ship missiles. The negotiations had run for at least two years and sped up after the June 2025 war. Whether a deal was completed is not established in the sources we read.

• Air-defence missiles, 2026. In July 2026, Reuters reported that Iran had signed a US$60–70 million deal for 300–400 Chinese shoulder-fired air-defence missile systems. The deal went through a Hong Kong-based intermediary; Reuters cited anonymous sources, as summarised by Newsweek.

• Components, 2026. In September 2026, The Wall Street Journal reported that Chinese suppliers had sent around 1,300 shipments of dual-use components to Iran’s defence ministry in the first half of 2026. We read the report as summarised by Iran International.

China’s foreign ministry has rejected such reports. On 13 April 2026 its spokesperson, Guo Jiakun, was asked about reports that China planned to send weapons to Iran and had already sent dual-use technology and components. He said China “always acts prudently and responsibly on the export of military products” and “opposes groundless smear and ill-intentioned association”.

In May, Trump claimed in a Fox News interview that Xi had told him Beijing would not provide military equipment to Iran. Chinese authorities did not immediately respond, Al Jazeera reported.

07Impact on International Relations: The “Axis of Upheaval”

“Axis of upheaval” is a phrase from Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Richard Fontaine, writing in Foreign Affairs in April 2024, for the growing coordination among China, Iran, North Korea and Russia. CNAS republished the piece. Three examples of that coordination on the Iran file:

• Joint drills. China, Iran and Russia held the Security Belt 2025 naval exercise near Iran’s Chabahar port in March 2025. China sent the guided-missile destroyer Baotou.

• Words. On 1 March 2026, China’s foreign ministry called the killing of Khamenei “a grave violation of Iran’s sovereignty and security” and said China “firmly opposes and strongly condemns it”.

• Votes. On 7 April 2026, China and Russia vetoed a Bahraini-drafted Security Council resolution on the Strait of Hormuz. In March they had abstained on a separate resolution, S/RES/2817 (2026), which passed and demanded an end to attacks by Iran and its proxies on Arab states.

What the sources do not show is China fighting for Iran. Earlier in the war, the Commons Library notes, China was among the countries that declined US requests to help secure Hormuz while hostilities went on.

China has also pressed for the strait to reopen.

In May 2026, after Trump met Xi in Beijing, the White House said the two had agreed the strait “must remain open to support the free flow of energy”. It added that Xi had made clear China’s opposition to “the militarisation of the strait and any effort to charge a toll for its use”. China’s own readout of the talks made no mention of Iran or the Strait of Hormuz, Al Jazeera reported.

On 16 September 2026, China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, met Iran’s Abbas Araghchi in Beijing. He said China was “willing to strengthen dialogue and cooperation with Iran, and safeguard Iran’s legitimate rights and interests”. He also urged “all parties to take effective measures to reopen the Strait of Hormuz at an early date”, as Al Jazeera reported.

Reports of quieter help are reports, and China has denied one of them.

In July 2026 Newsweek described Beijing as having “limited its direct involvement in the conflict”. It added that, according to Reuters and other media reports, Beijing was providing Iran with satellite imagery of US military targets around the Gulf. In September, Beijing refuted US media reports that Chinese entities had supplied Tehran with satellite images of a base housing US troops in Jordan.

08Trade Realignments and Financial Architecture: De-Dollarization

The war put payment channels outside the US dollar to use.

• Hormuz tolls. From mid-March 2026, according to the analytics firm TRM Labs as reported by Fortune, Iran’s military charged ships up to $2 million each to transit the strait. It accepted Chinese yuan, bitcoin and potentially the stablecoin USDT. TRM Labs said at the time that it was not seeing on-chain evidence that tolls were being paid in crypto at scale. The Commons Library reports that some ships had paid in yuan, and that the US sanctioned Iran’s new strait authority.

• The renminbi’s share. In the Bank for International Settlements’ 2025 survey, the renminbi’s share of global foreign exchange turnover rose to 8.5% in April 2025, continuing a rise since 2013.

China’s currency features in the toll workaround, though by the White House’s account above, China opposes the tolls themselves.

09Where things stand, 13 October 2026

The war has paused and restarted. On 8 April 2026, Pakistan’s prime minister announced a conditional two-week ceasefire, later extended. On 17 June the US and Iran signed a 14-point memorandum of understanding, which set an initial 60-day period for talks on Hormuz, Iran’s nuclear and missile programmes and sanctions.

The memorandum broke down. On 8 July, after Iranian attacks on commercial ships, US strikes on Iran resumed, and President Trump said he thought the memorandum was “over”. Its 60-day period ran out in mid-August, with little sign that either side wanted to extend it, according to Al Jazeera.

September: more ships, and estimates that differ. Iranian attacks on shipping have sharply curtailed traffic through the strait, and the United States maintains a blockade of Iranian ports in some form.

On 28 September Al Jazeera reported that the US military had moved “considerably more energy shipments” through the strait in recent weeks. Even so, the waterway was “still far away from its pre-war unimpeded state”.

That report set out three estimates against roughly 20 million barrels a day before the war. Kpler expected crude exports through the strait to average 7.4 million barrels a day in September. The US Energy Secretary said nearly 13 million barrels of crude a day were passing. The US Treasury Secretary gave 15–22 million.

They do not all measure the same thing, and they come from parties with different stakes. Iran’s Revolutionary Guards say the strait stays closed to vessels that do not coordinate passage with Iranian authorities.

Before the war, around 20% of global petroleum passed through the strait each year, according to the Commons Library.

The latest proposal was rejected. On 25 September Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, presented a plan to reopen the strait within seven days. It depended on the US releasing frozen funds, lifting oil sanctions and ending its blockade. On 26 September President Trump said it “would not be acceptable”.

Iran set conditions. On 4 October Iran’s parliament speaker and top negotiator, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, said the strait “will not open until our seven conditions based on the Islamabad memorandum are met”. He was quoted by the Iranian state-linked agency Nournews, as reported by Al Jazeera.

October: attacks rose, and flows pulled back from recent weeks. CNBC reported these figures on 9 October:

• Eleven tankers came under attack while transiting Hormuz in the week that ended 4 October. That was the most strikes on commercial ships since the war began, according to International Maritime Organization data.

• Exports through Hormuz stood at 8.5 million barrels a day for the week ended 7 October, about 40% below normal before the war, according to Kpler.

• CNBC adds that crude oil exports from the Middle East had rebounded in September to prewar levels. That was in large part because the US military escorted ships through Hormuz along Oman’s coast.

• US Central Command said 20 million barrels of crude had transited the strait, rejecting Iranian claims that the waterway was closed.

• Since late February, at least 24 sailors have died in attacks on 100 commercial ships in Hormuz, the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, according to the IMO.

8 Apr	Pakistan announces a conditional two-week ceasefire, later extended
17 Jun	US and Iran sign a 14-point memorandum of understanding
8 Jul	US strikes resume after attacks on shipping; Trump calls the memorandum “over”
Mid-Aug	The memorandum’s 60-day period runs out
26 Sep	Trump rejects Iran’s seven-day plan to reopen Hormuz
4 Oct	Iran says Hormuz stays closed until its seven conditions are met

Dated snapshot. From the House of Commons Library, Al Jazeera and NPR.

10What this snapshot does and does not show

On the evidence above, China’s part in this war has been as a customer, a diplomat and, by report, a supplier, not a combatant. It bought most of Iran’s oil and defended Iran in words and at the Security Council.

It has also pressed for the strait to reopen, and its currency features in some of the payment workarounds. The reported arms and component deals remain reports.

What the snapshot cannot tell you is how the war ends. That is why this page is dated, and why the figures above each name their source and their date. A reader checking a claim here later should check it against the newest version of that source.

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How we checked this · Last checked October 2026

• First written in March 2026 and brought up to date on 13 October 2026. Every figure is dated to the source it comes from.
• The October update reread the latest reporting: Al Jazeera on 4 October and CNBC on 9 October 2026, which reports International Maritime Organization and Kpler figures. Al Jazeera's reports of 14 May and 16 September 2026 were added for China's diplomacy.
• The White House statement on the May 2026 meeting was not opened; it is quoted as Al Jazeera reports it. The Wall Street Journal and Reuters arms reports were read as summarised by Iran International and Newsweek.
• The arms and component deals are press reports from unnamed sources, and none is a confirmed transaction. China's foreign ministry has rejected the arms reports, and China has refuted the September reports about satellite images of a base in Jordan; the page gives those denials beside the reports.
• Shipping estimates differ with who measures and what: crude exports, all oil or transits. The page gives each with its source and date. It describes events and makes no prediction.

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